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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)(1953
as amended), has assigned this case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(4).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Union Pacific believes the issues on review can be stated as follows: (1) Is Alecia
Jensen's ("Jensen") claim of negligent train speed preempted by federal law? (2) Was the
trial court correct in ruling as a matter of law that the speed of the train, as alleged by Jensen,
was not a proximate cause of the accident? (3) Was the trial court correct in ruling as a
matter of law that Union Pacific was not responsible for any unsafe conditions which may
have been present at the crossing at the time of the accident and which may have created "a
more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing? and (4) Was the trial court correct in ruling that
there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute that Union Pacific sounded the train's
bell and whistle as it approached the crossing?
Upon review of a grant of a motion for summaiy judgment, the Appellate Court views
the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below, and gives no deference to the
trial court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
45 U.S.C.A. § 434 (Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970):
The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations,
orders, and standards relating to railroad safety shall be
nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt
or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard
relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has
adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the
subject matter of such State requirement. A State may adopt or
continue in force an additional or more stringent law, rule,
regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety when
necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety
hazard, and when not incompatible with any Federal law, rule,
regulation, order, or standard, and when not creating an undue
burden on interstate commerce.
49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a): Classes of track: operating speed limits.
Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this
section and § § 213.57, 213.59(a), 213.113(a), and 213.137(b)
and (c), the following maximum allowable operating speeds
apply:
The maximum allowable
operating
speed for
passenger
trains is—

The maximum allowable
operating
speed for
freight
trains I S -

Over track that meets all of the requirements prescribed in this part
far-

Class 1 track
Class 2 track
Class 3 track
Class 4 track
Class 5 track
Class 6 track

10
25
40
60
80
110

49 C.F R. § 213.9 is set forth in its entirety in Addendum A.
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15
30
60
80
90
110

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Union Pacific generally agrees with Jensen's statement of the nature of the case.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Union Pacific supplements Jensen's statement of the course of proceedings and
disposition below as follows:
Union Pacific timely filed its Reply Memorandum on March 8, 1995, arguing, inter
alia- that Jensen's expert witness affidavits concerning the speed limit and speed of the train
were incompetent, conclusionaiy, and legally insufficient to raise any genuine issue of fact.
In response, Jensen filed a motion on March 14, 1995, for leave to submit an additional
expert witness affidavit. Union Pacific responded byfilingan objection to the motion on the
grounds that that affidavit was also inadmissible because it made legal conclusion %
contained inadmissible hearsay testimony, and contained testimony that was irrelevant. The
court did not rule on either the motion or the objection concerning the admissibility of such
evidence.
Jensen was a passenger in her automobile which was being driven at the time offhe,
accident by her 17 year old boyfriend, Bruce Brinkmeier. Brinkmeier was never includes
or added as a defendant in the lawsuit; however, on April 10, 1995, Union Pacific filec?
motion to name him as an additional defendant for the limited purpose of apportioning fauli
The trial court did not address this motion.
On April 11, 1995, Union Pacific submitted a Supplemental Reply Memorar&iiL*
3

bringing the Court's attention to a recently discovered group of cases directly supportive of
Union Pacific's argument that even assuming, arguendo, a train speed of 1-2 m.p.h. over the
effective speed limit, as argued by Jensen, such speed could not possibly have been a
proximate cause of the accident. It was on this basis, rather than the argument of federal
preemption, that the trial court decided the issue of negligent train speed.
Statement of Facts
Jensen, age 17, was seriously injured when the automobile in which she was riding
as a passenger drove in front of and was struck by a Union Pacific coal train. The accident
occurred at approximately 12:10 p.m. on February 5, 1994, at a public railroad crossing of
Union Pacific's Provo Subdivision mainline trackage located near 650 West and 5950 South
in Spanish Fork. [Utah County Sheriffs Investigation File ("Sheriffs File"), R. 143-123].
According to Jensen's Interrogatory Answers (No. 14), Jensen's car, a 1982 Honda
Civic, had been purchased and was owned by Danny Jensen, Jensen's father, for Jensen's
personal use. The car was being driven at the time of the accident by Jensen's boyfriend,
Bruce Brinkmeier, also age 17. Brinkmeier was not licensed to drive an automobile, and
received a citation for not being licensed following the accident. (Sheriffs File, R. 143-123).
The train was traveling from Milford to Provo in a southwest to northeast direction.
The trackage at the location of the crossing is relatively straight and flat. The road (650
West) travels in a north/south direction and the car was traveling southbound. The road is
straight and flat for hundreds of feet before reaching the crossing. The trackage and road
intersect at a greater that 90° angle with reference to the directions of approach for the train
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and car. [Sheriffs File, R. 143-123; Lawrence Curley Affidavit ("Curley Affidavit") with
appended diagram and photographs, R. 121-106].
The crossing is located in a rural farming area and is surrounded by open fields on the
approach side. A Utah Livestock Auction building and animal pens are located in the
southwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is on the opposite side of the tracks
from which Jensen's automobile approached. The building and pens are located off the
railroad right of way. The northwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is the view
quadrant for the approaching train and car, is an open field. (Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106;
Aerial photograph, R. 104).
650 West is an asphalted road and the railroad crossing was planked and asphalted.
An advance stop sign warning sign was posted along side 650 West at approximately 572 feet
north of the crossing. An advance railroad crossing warning sign was posted along side the
road at approximately 332 feet north of the crossing. An advance railroad crossing warning
sign was painted on the road surface at approximately 281 feet north of the crossing.
Another railroad crossing warning sign, somewhat faded but still observable, was painted on
the road surface at approximately 175 feet north of the crossing. Stop signs and railroad
crossing "crossbuck" signs were located on both sides of the crossing. The stop and
crossbuck signs on the north side were located approximately 17 and 9 1/2 feet, respectively,
away from the tracks. White stop sign stop lines were painted on the roadway surface on
both sides of the crossing approximately 22 feet away from the tracks. All of these signs,
with the possible exception of the second painted road sign, were in excellent condition and
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easily visible to motorists approaching the crossing in a southbound direction. (Curley
Affidavit, R. 121-106).
The train was an empty coal train with three locomotives and 46 trailing empty coal
cars. The train weighed 1424 tons and was 2622 feet in length. The locomotives were
painted yellow and ranged in heightfrom15 1/2 feet to a little over 16 feet. The total length
of the three yellow locomotives which were coupled end to end was approximately 200 feet.
[Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106; Ryan Puffer Affidavit ("Puffer Affidavit"), R. 102-98].
The federally set speed limit for the trackage and train in question was 60 m.p.h. By
means of an internal "Timetable" rule, Union Pacific had voluntarily imposed a 50 m.p.h.
speed limit for its freight trains.

[49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a), R. 88-87; William VanTrump

Affidavit ("VanTrump Affidavit"), R. 96-95; Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98].
Ryan Puffer was the engineer of the train and was controlling the train's movements
from the cab of the leading locomotive. He was operating the train at approximately 50
m.p.h. as the train approached the crossing and at the time he placed the train into emergency
braking just before the accident. He monitored the train speed by means of a speedometer
in the cab of the leading locomotive. [Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98; George Ohlsson Affidavit
("Ohlsson Affidavit"), R. 93-90].
Federal law found at 49 C.F.R. § 229.117 (Addendum C), requires every locomotive
operating in excess of 20 m.p.h. to be equipped with a "speed indicator" accurate within ±
5 m.p.h. at speeds above 30 m.p.h. One of the train's locomotives (No. 3799) was equipped
with such a speed indicator, which is sometimes referred to as a "speed recorder" or "event
6

recorder." A tape printed outfromthe speed indicator device shows the train to be traveling
between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least the last three miles before braking was initiated.
(Ohlsson Affidavit, R. 93-90).
The speed indicator on locomotive 3799 was of the older "8 track" cassette type which
does not have sufficient channels to record the operation of the whistle. While the speed
indicator printout tape has a "horn" line where whistle activation can be shown if recorded
by the device, the speed indicator was not equipped to make such a recording. (Ohlsson
Affidavit, R. 90). Accordingly, the fact that there are no printout markings on the hom line
is not evidence that the whistle was not sounded. It is evidence only that the speed indicator
was not capable of making the whistle recording. [Supplemental Affidavit of George
Ohlsson ("Supplemental Ohlsson Affidavit"), R. 259-257].
The leading locomotive (No. 9390), was equipped with two headlights which were
operating on high beam as the train approached the crossing. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98;
Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106).
Engineer Puffer was sounding the locomotive whistle and bell as the train approached
the crossing. He began sounding the whistle and bell approximately 1/4 mile awayfromthe
5950 South crossing and continued to sound the whistle and bell from the 5950 South
crossing on up to the point of the accident at 650 West. The distance between the 5950
South and 650 West crossings is approximately 1100 feet. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98
Sheriffs File, R. 143-123; Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106).
At about the time the train passed over the 5950 South crossing, Engineer Puff
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noticed a truck pulling a horse trailer begin to drive over the tracks in a southbound direction.
Puffer focused his attention on the truck/horse trailer to make certain that it would get out
of the way. Puffer was sounding the whistle and bell as he watched the truck/horse trailer
drive over the crossing. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98; Sheriffs File, R. 143-123.)
The whistle and bell were operating properly and the whistle was a particularly loud
whistle. The locomotive bell was also ringing. Engineer Puffer turned the bell on when he
started sounding the whistle for the 5950 South crossing. He never turned the bell off until
after the accident. Puffer operated the whistle and bell continuously from more than one
quarter mile away up to the point of the accident. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98).
Shortly after seeing the truck/horse trailer clear the crossing, Puffer noticed the Jensen
car rolling towards the crossing. The car was following a few seconds behind the truck/horse
trailer and moving past the stop sign. Puffer had the impression that the car never stopped
for the stop sign. The car rolled onto the track directly in front of the train. (Puffer
Affidavit, R. 102-98; Sheriffs File, R. 143-123).
The train was a few hundred feetfromthe crossing when engineer Puffer first saw the
Jensen car approaching the crossing. Puffer placed the train into emergency braking
immediately upon seeing the Jensen car. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98).
According to Jensen's Interrogatory Answers (Nos. 15 and 35), Brinkmeier and Jensen
had come from Brinkmeier's home in Salt Lake City, with Brinkmeier driving, to the place
of the accident. The purpose of the drive was to visit Brinkmeier's foster parents who lived
in the area and to see where Brinkmeier had worked just north of the crossing.
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Brinkmeierfs deposition was never taken nor did he give an affidavit. However
according to a recorded statement of Brinkmeier, a transcription of which was attached as
an exhibit to Jensen's Memorandum in Opposition to Union Pacific's Motion (R. 178-158),
Brinkmeier and Jensen were playing a "wish" game upon arrival at the crossing. They did
so by lifting their feet up off the floor of the car and touching something metallic with their
fingers while at the same time making a wish and crossing the tracks. Jensen agrees that they
may have been playing this game. [Brinkmeier Statement, R. 168-166; Affidavit of Alecia
Jensen ("Jensen Affidavit"), R. 181-180].
Brinkmeier and Jensen never saw nor heard the train at any time before impact. They
were playing the game and looking in a forward and/or upward direction to try and find a
metal screw to touch as the car was at or near the stop sign. They did not look or listen for
train traffic because of being preoccupied with playing the game. (Jensen Affidavit,
R. 181-180; Sheriffs File, R. 143-123).
In Jensen's Answer to Interrogatory No. 25, which specifically requested that she
identify "any and all obstructions to your vision of the train's approach and railroad
crossing," Jensen answered: "I do not recall if the view was obstructed." (R. 265). In her
subsequent affidavit response to Union Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment, Jensen
recalled "that there were a lot of trucks and trailers which obstructed our view of the tracks
in all directions." (Jensen Affidavit, R. 181).
In Jensen's Answer to Interrogatory No. 26, responding to the question of how the
accident happened, she stated: "I remember nothing of the accident and very little, if
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anything, of what happened prior to the accident." (R. 218). In her affidavit later submitted
in opposition to Union Pacific's motion, Jensen stated that she did not recall playing the wish
game (but may have been); but did remember traffic congestion at the crossing which
obstructed the view of the tracks in all directions; and did recall never hearing or seeing the
train. (Jensen Affidavit, R. 181-180). This is Jensen's only evidence of noise and traffic
congestion at the crossing.
Brinkmeier, in his recorded statement attached to Jensen's Memorandum in
Opposition, stated that he was "not paying attention" at the crossing and "never heard
anything." (R. 164).
Independent witnesses Gerald and Whitney Hill and Johnny Starks were interviewed
by the Utah County Sheriffs Office. They provided written statements to the Sheriffs Office
but no depositions or affidavits were obtained in the lawsuit. The Hills made no reference
to whether the whistle was or was not sounded—the subject was not addressed at all.
However, Starks advised that, "I heard the train honking." (Sheriffs File, R. 139, 135, 134,
131).
In addition to being cited for not having a driver's license, Brinkmeier was also cited
for "failure to stop at stop sign." (Sheriffs File, R. 143-123).
Emergency braking is the quickest way to stop a train, but because the car was so
close, it was not possible to slow the train before impact. It took the train approximately 1400
feet to stop after emergency braking was initiated. The brakes operated normally and the
stop was a good one under the circumstances. It was not possible for engineer Puffer to stop
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the train any quicker. Puffer did everything within his power to warn of the train's approach
and to stop the train after suddenly perceiving that the car may not stop. (Puffer Affidavit,
R. 102-98; Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106).
The left side of the snowplow of the leading locomotive struck the right front portion
of the Jensen car, throwing it in a northeasterly direction. Both occupants were ejected from
the car and thrown in the same northeasterly direction. Neither occupant was wearing a seat
belt. (Sheriffs File, R. 143-123; Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106; Puffer's Affidavit, R.
102-98).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

There is no factual dispute that the train's speed was in the range of 49-52

m.p.h. at the time of the accident. Such speed is not unreasonable, excessive or negligent
as a matter of law since it is within the 60 m.p.h. limit established by the Federal Railroad
Administration ("FRA") in 49 C.F.R. 213.9(a), which limit preempts any common law claim
that the train should have been traveling at a slower speed. The 60 m.p.h. speed limit
specified in § 213.9(a) preempts any claim of excessive speed based upon Union Pacific's
timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h. which was a limit voluntarily set by the Railroad and does
not have the effect of an enforceable regulation and cannot be used as the basis for a
negligent speed claim. In any event, a speed of 51 or 52 m.p.h. cannot be considered is
violating even the Railroad's timetable limit of 50 m.p.h. in view of the ± 5 m.p.h. vari&.Ion
required by 49 C.F.R. 229.117, nor can a speed of 1-2 m.p.h. over the speed limit, whatever
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it was, be considered a proximate cause of the accident as a matter of law.
2.

Jensen offered no probative evidence that Union Pacific did not comply with

the whistle statute, and no genuine issue of material fact exists on that issue. Jensen's
affidavit testimony that she did not hear the whistle is not admissible or probative because
it contradicts her earlier interrogatory answer, and because it is negative testimony. The
unverified and unsworn statements of Jensen's other "whistle witnesses" are inadmissible and
not probative of the issue of whether the whistle was sounded. The speed indicator printout
is not evidence that the whistle was not sounded-only that the speed indicator did not record
the whistle. The only admissible, probative evidence on this issue is the affidavit testimony
of Engineer Puffer who is very clear that the whistle was appropriate sounded.
3.

Jensen offered no probative evidence that the crossing was more than

ordinarily hazardous. Her affidavit testimony of obstructions to view should be disregarded
because it contradicts her earlier answers to interrogatories. The law imposed no duty of
additional care on Union Pacific with respect to the condition of the crossing or handling of
the train. The obstructions, if any, created by the Utah Livestock Auction premises were off
the right of way and not under Union Pacific's control, and as a matter of law, Union Pacific
had no duty to signalize the crossing or reduce any further the speed of the train under the
federally mandated speed limit.
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ARGUMENT
I
JENSEN'S CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT TRAIN SPEED IS
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.
The "authorized speed limit" for the train and trackage in question was set by the
Federal Railroad Administration at 60 mp.h., 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a), and such limit preempts
Jensen's claim of excessive train speed as a matter of law. CSX Transp.r Inc. v. Easterwood.
113 S.Ct. 732; 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). In Easterwood the plaintiff sued for the death of
her husband caused in a railroad crossing accident, alleging the same common law
negligence claims made by Jensen, of excessive train speed and a crossing that was unsafe.
CSX argued, inter alia, that plaintiffs claim of excessive train speed was preempted under
49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a), and the Supreme Court agreed. In rendering its decision, the Supreme
Court clarified the extent to which federal railroad safety laws and regulations preempt state
laws concerning train movements. The Court held that federal regulations implemented
pursuant to the Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970,45 U.S.C. § 434, may preempt any state law,
rule, etc., including, "legal duties imposed on railroads by the common law," 123 L.Ed.2d
at 396; and that plaintifFs common law negligence allegation of excessive train speed was
preempted by the maximum speed limits established by the FRA. The Court stated:
On their face, the provisions of § 213.9(a) address only the
maximum speeds at which trains are permitted to travel given
the nature of the track on which they operate. Nevertheless,
related safety regulations adopted by the Secretary reveal that
the limits were adopted only after the hazards posed by track
13

conditions were taken into account. Understood in the context
of the overall structure of the regulations, the speed limits must
be read as not only establishing a ceiling, but also precluding
additional state regulation of the sort which respondent seeks to
impose on petitioner.
123 L.Ed.2d at 402-03. Subsequent federal district court decisions, following Easterwood
have further interpreted 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) to preempt state common law claims based
upon a railroad's violation of its "internal policies" requiring adherence to municipal speed
restrictions. Bowman v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.. 832 F.Supp. 1014, 1017 (D.S.C. 1993);
and state common law claims based upon a railroad's violation of local speed ordinances, Id.;
Landrum v. Norfolk Southern Corp.. 836 F.Supp. 373, 375 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
In the present case it is undisputed that the train was operating within the federally
set speed limit of 60 m.p.h. The fact that Union Pacific had voluntarily set a lower "internal
policy" timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h. is irrelevant since any claim based upon a violation
of the railroad set limit is still a state common law negligence claim which is preempted by
49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a). Id,. Accordingly, since the issue of train speed limits has been
specifically preempted by federal law and Union Pacific's train was operating within the
federal limit, the train's speed, whether it was 49,50, 51 or 52 m.p.h. cannot provide a basis
for Jensen arguing a state common law negligence theory.
1.

49 C.F.R § 217 Does Not Authorize Timetables to Change
the Federal Speed Limits Set in 49 C.F.R. § 213.9.

In an effort to circumvent the defense of federal preemption of train speed limits,
Jensen argues that since 49 C.F.R. § 217 (actually § 217.7) (Addendum B) requires railroad
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timetables befiledwith the FRA, § 217.7 thereby makes Union Pacific's timetable speed of
50 m.p.h. the enforceable federal speed limit in this case. While § 217.7 does require
railroads tofiletheir operating rules and timetables, etc., with the FRA, it says nothing about
the provisions of such rules becoming enforceable federal regulations or that timetable speed
limits filed with the FRA under this section preempt or become an exception to the speed
limits specifically set by 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a).
Realizing that § 217.7 makes no such provision or mention, Jensen offered the
affidavits of Bruce Reading and Robert Hitson to inappropriately make the erroneous legal
conclusions that railroad speed limitsfiledwith the FRA under § 217.7 become enforceable
federal regulations. Such testimony is inadmissible under Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence,
which does not allow a witness, expert or not, to give legal conclusions. Davidson v. Prince.
813 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App.), QSTL denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Clearly, Bruce
Readings1 assertion that the federal speed limits set in 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) are "clarified and
restricted" by 49 C.F.R. § 217, is a legal conclusion and should be disregarded. The case of
Wright v. Illinois Central R. Co. 868 F.Supp. 183 (S.D. Miss. 1994) is directly in point.
There, plaintiffs alleged that the railroad was negligent in "operating its train at an excessive
speed just prior to and at the time of the collision." The passenger train was traveling 79
m.p.h. which was within the FRA speed limit of 80 m.p.h. [as set forth in 49 C.F.R. §
231.9(a)], but in excess of the limit set by a municipal speed ordinance. The Railroads
"internal policies" (undoubtedly found in the Railroad's operating rules or timetable),
required the Railroad to comply with municipal speed ordinances. In support of thei;
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argument that the Railroad was negligent for violating the municipal speed limit, plaintiffs
offered the conclusionaiy testimony of an expert witness that the FRA regulations pertained
only to "open tracks, and not to tracks within municipal or residential districts;" thus, the
regulations did not preempt plaintiffs' claim. I& at 187. In ruling that the expert's testimony
was a legal conclusion and did "not create a genuine issue of material fact," the Court stated:
This assertion by [the expert] is unsupported by law or statute,
and amounts to no more than the legal conclusion of a plaintiffs
witness, which is inadmissible to defeat a summary judgment
motion. [Citations omitted]. ("Unsupported . . . affidavits
setting forth ultimate or conclusionary facts and conclusions of
law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for
summary judgment.") [Citations omitted]. A reading of 49
C.F.R. § 213.9(a) discloses no mention of an "open countryside"
exception for tracks in urban areas. The Court holds that the
conclusionary allegations of plaintiff s experts on this issue fail
to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand
defendant's motion for summary judgment.
868 F.Supp. at 187. Likewise, here, the FRA regulations [both § 213.9(a) and § 217.7] make
no mention of a timetable speed limit exception to the maximum speed limits set in 49 C.F.R.
§ 213.9(a), and plaintiffs expert witnesses cannot be heard to "rule" to the contrary. A
railroad's "internal policies" regarding train speed, whether they are to abide municipal speed
ordinances and/or railroad timetable speed limit restrictions, which are inconsistent with the
preemptive and controlling FRA regulations, are irrelevant and cannot be relied upon to
create issues of negligence against the Railroad.
Furthermore, the case of Southern Pacific Trans. Co. Public Utilities Commission of
Oregon. 9 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1993) has specifically ruled that railroad rules filed pursuant
to § 217.7 do not thereby become federal laws. In that case an Oregon law permitted local
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authorities to ban the sounding of locomotive whistles under certain conditions. Desiring for
safety reasons to be able to continue sounding whistles, Southern Pacific argued that the state
law was preempted by a number of federal regulations, including 49 C.F.R. § 217 which,
it argued, required federal filing of the railroad's operating rules pertaining to the sounding
of whistles, thereby raising such rules to the level of federal law. The Ninth Circuit
disagreed, ruling that although rules are required to befiledwith the FRA, "because the FRA
neither approves nor adopts the railroads1 rules in any manner [only requires they be filed],
the rules do not have the force of law and therefore cannot preempt the Oregon statute." 9
F.3d at 81, n. 5. Accordingly, if Southern Pacific's internal operating rules which require the
sounding of a whistle at railroad crossings and which are required to be filed with the FRA
under 49 C.F.R. § 217 do not have the "force of law," neither does Union Pacific's timetable
speed limit in the case at bar.
2.

The Train Was Traveling Within the Timetable Speed Limit
of 50 m.p.h.

49 C.F.R. § 229.117 (Addendum C) requires every locomotive operating in excess of
20 m.p.h. to be equipped with a "speed indicator" accurate within ± 3 m.p.h. at speeds of
10-30 m.p.h., and accurate within 5 m.p.h. at speeds above 30 m.p.h. These federal
accuracy standards recognize the inherent variables in locomotive speed indicators referred
to by Union Pacific's expert witness, George Ohlsson (R.93-90). Such standards preempt
any argument of excessive speed as long as the speed is within the variables allowed.
Accordingly, here any speed shown on the speed indicator printout up to and including 55
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m.p.h. would be an allowable variable under 49 C.F.R. § 229.117. Therefore, not only was
the train traveling within the controlling federal speed limit of 60 m.p.h., but it was also
traveling within the timetable limit of 50 m.p.h. as that limit must be interpreted by factoring
in the 5 m.p.h. variable allowed by § 229.117. To rule otherwise would be to inappropriately
assume that the speed indicator was precisely accurate when in fact the actual speed may
have been well below 50 m.p.h.

n.
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TIMETABLE SPEED
LIMIT OF 50 M.P.H. WAS THE ENFORCEABLE LIMIT, THE
TRAIN'S SPEED WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT.
Even though the trial court agreed, at pp. 9-10 of its Memorandum Decision, that as
a matter of law Union Pacific's timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h. did not have the force and
effect of federal law under 49 C.F.R. § 217, the Court chose to decide the speed issue on the
basis of proximate cause.
It is Hornbook Law that excessive speed is judicially significant only where it is the
proximate cause of the accident; and that an unlawful speed is not causal merely because it
places a vehicle at a particular place at a particular time-it is only causal where it prevents
or retards the operator from slowing down, stopping or otherwise controlling the train or
vehicle so as to avoid the collision; or where it misleads the driver of the other vehicle.
Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice, Vol. 2, § 105.6, pp. 313-318; Dombeck v. Chicago.
Milwaukee. St. Paul & Pacific R. Co.. 129 N.W.2d 185 (Wise. 1964); Horsley v. Robinson.
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186 P.2d 592 (Utah 1947); CTMalley V, Eagan, 2 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1931); Whiffin v Union
Pacific R Co.. 89 P.2d 540 (Idaho 1949).
Dombeck v. Chicago, Milwaukee. St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., supra, which the trial
court found directly in point, is decisive of this issue. There, the driver of the automobile
saw the train at the last minute and tried to accelerate over the crossing in front of the train
because the road was too slippery to stop. The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the railroad
was negligent in allowing its train to travel 25 m.p.h. over the railroad's timetable speed limit
of 40 m.p.h. In ruling that even 25 m.p.h. over the speed limit could not have been a
proximate cause of the accident, the Court stated:
Notwithstanding the evidence as to speed we conclude
that under the facts of this case, assuming that the speed of the
train was negligent, such speed as a matter of law could not be
causal. In order to be causal the train's speed must either have
misled Richard Dombeck, the driver of the car, or it must have
interfered with the control and management of the train to the
extent of rendering it probable that such control and
management would have otherwise been effective to have
avoided the collision. The evidence here excludes both of these
hypotheses.
Richard's testimony clearly excludes the possibility that
he was misled as to the speed of the train and that he attempted
to cross infrontof it on reliance that it was traveling at a lesser
speed than it actually was.

. . . the reason Richard attempted to cross the track by
accelerating instead of trying to stop was because he had
concluded that he could not stop before reaching the track.
Speed is not causal merely because the train arrived at the
crossing the instant it did while if it had been going slower the
car might have safely crossed ahead of it. [Citation omitted].
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. . . There is no evidence in the record that the application of the
emergency brakes at a point 30 feet from the crossing would
have reduced the train's speed sufficiently to have avoided the
collision. We think the probabilities are that it would not. In
any event, a jury should not be permitted to speculate as to this.
The situation is different with respect to the operation of

automobiles where it can be assumed that jurors possess some
knowledge of stopping distances and effectiveness of
automobile brakes, This is not the situation with respect to the
operation and stopping of trains,
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
failing to submit a jury question as to the train's speed since the
evidence could not support a finding that any such speed was
causal.
129 N.W.2d at 192-93 (Emphasis added). Likewise, here, the speed of the train, regardless
of whether it was 49, 50, 51 or 52 m.p.h., could not possibly have been a proximate cause
of the accident. There is no dispute that Jensen and Brinkmeier never looked for, listened
for, saw or heard the train prior to impact-they were both totally oblivious to the presence
of the train. Therefore, neither could have been mislead as to the speed of the train since
they had no idea what that speed was.
Furthermore, Jensen made no argument nor produced any evidence to the effect that
had the train been traveling 1-2 m.p.h. slower at the time Engineer Puffer activated the
emergency brakes, it could have been stopped or at least slowed sufficiently to have allowed
Jensen's automobile to pass safely over the crossing. Indeed, common sense as well as the
only evidence on the issue is directly to the contraiy. Engineer Puffer at p. 4 of his Affidavit
(R. 99), testified that a train such as the one he was operating at the time of the accident
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"takes a number of seconds, after placing it into emergency braking, before it even begins
to slow down. On this occasion the train did not even begin to slow down before the
accident happened." George Ohlsson testified at p. 3 of his Affidavit (R. 91), that a small
difference of a few miles per hour "would not have made any significant difference in terms
of how far the train would have gone before slowing down or stopping after the brakes were
applied;" and that "a matter of 1 m.p.h. for a train this long and heavy and traveling at this
speed is, in my opinion, insignificant in terms of stopping time and distance". Such
testimony is supported by explanations provided by the Utah Supreme Court in other
crossing accident cases. For example, in Van Waggoner v. Union Pacific R.. 186 P.2d 293
(Utah 1947), the Utah Supreme Court explained:
Because of the weight of trains, the impossibility of stopping within
short distances, and the impossibility of turning to avoid objects in its path, the
same right of way rule does not apply as in the case of two automobiles.
Trains cannot be stopped in time to avoid collisions if the time interval is
shortened to a matter of.. . seconds
186 P.2d at 300-301. And in Gregory v. Denver & R.G.W. R.. 329 P.2d 407 (Utah 1958),
the court said:
It is contrary to the generally known laws of physics and common sense
to expect a train, with its great weight and momentum to stop within the short
distance available after the instant it should have become apparent that
Gregory was not going to stop. After that point was reached, there is nothing
a crew could have done to avoid the collision. And this is true whether the
train was traveling fast or slow and whether the crew saw him or not.
329 P.2d at 409.
Jensen erroneously applies a "but for" test in arguing that an allegedly excessive train
speed of 1-2 m.p.h. imposes liability on Union Pacific. The test is one of proximate cause,
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not cause in fact. Were it not so, as stated by Prosser, "the consequences of an act [would]
go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event [would] go back to the discovery of
America and beyond." Prosser, Law of Torts (4th Ed. 1982), Chap. 7, p. 236. Under the
circumstances of the accident, the speed of Union Pacificfs train, regardless of whether it was
49 or 52 m.p.h., was merely a condition of the accident, as was Jensen's getting out of bed
in the morning, and extremely remote in the change of causation. Therefore, even assuming,
arguendo, that the enforceable speed limit was the timetable limit of 50 m.p.h., a speed of
1 or 2 m.p.h. in excess thereof could not have been a proximate cause of the accident as a
matter of law.

in.
JENSEN DID NOT RAISE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
CONCERNING WHETHER UNION PACIFIC COMPLIED WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 56-1-14 IN SOUNDING
THE TRAIN'S WHISTLE AND BELL.
1.

Jensen's Affidavit Is Inconsistent With Her Previous Testimony.

Jensen's statement in her affidavit, submitted in opposition to Union Pacific's motion,
that she "did not hear the train blow its whistle or sound its horn anytime prior to the
collision" is inconsistent with her earlier Answer to Interrogatory No. 26, that she did not
remember what happened. Since a party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that
contradicts prior sworn testimony in order to create an issue of fact, Jensen's affidavit
testimony that she did not hear the whistle should be disregarded. Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d
1170 (Utah 1983); Gawv. State. 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct App. 1990).
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2.

Jensen's Statement In Her Affidavit That She Did Not Hear
The Whistle Is Not Probative Evidence,

Jensen does not testify in her affidavit that the whistle was not sounded—only that she
did not hear it. Such a statement is considered "negative" testimony and, without more, is
not sufficiently probative to raise an issue of fact regarding whether the whistle was blown,
in the face of the positive testimony set forth in the affidavit of Engineer Puffer that he did,
in fact, sound the whistle. In order for Jensen's testimony to rise to the level of positive
testimony sufficient to raise a question of fact, she must lay an appropriate foundation by
additionally testifying that not only was she in a physical position to hear the whistle, but
also that she was paying sufficient attention that she would have heard the whistle had it
been sounded. Hudson v. Union Pacific RH 233 P.2d 357 (Utah 1951); Seabold v. Union
Pacific RH 239 P.2d 175 (Utah 1951); Bebout v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.. 982 F.2d 1178
(7th Cir. 1993). Jensen did not lay that kind of foundation in her affidavit. In view of her
earlier testimony that she remembered little if anything of the events leading up to the
accident, and admission that she may have been involved in playing the "wish game" with
Bruce Brinkmeier, Jensen cannot do so now. The fact that she did not hear any whistle even
though others did, including independent witnesses, is supportive of the fact that Jensen was
not paying attention.
3.

Bruce Brinkmeier's Statement Is Not Probative Evidence.

For the same reasons set forth in paragraph 111.2 above, Bruce Brinkmeier's unsworn
negative statement that he did not hear the whistle does not raise an issue of fact concerning
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whether the whistle was blown. As stated at p. 15 of his statement submitted by Jensen
(R. 164):
CR-(Claim Representative) Did you hear any trains coming?
I—(Interviewee) Nope, I didn't hear the train or a horn.
CR—You weren't paying attention for any train horns, do you
know or
?
I—Oh, I'm sure I was subconsciously, but not paying attention.
CR-Right.
I-But the people, the witnesses at the auction, said that he was
blowing his horn from a ways back.
CR-Right.
I—But I never heard anything.
Not only does Brinkmeier admit that he never heard the whistle, but he also admits
that he was not listening or paying attention. Thus, he impliedly admits that the whistle
could have been sounded-he just didn't hear it. His statement is negative testimony and
cannot be changed into positive testimony since he cannot meet the second portion of the
two-pronged foundational test of paying sufficient attention.
In any event, Brinkmeier's statement is not in affidavit form and is not, therefore,
competent to raise an issue of fact in the face of Engineer Puffer's Affidavit that the whistle
was sounded. It is clear that when a motion for summary judgment is filed and supported
by Affidavit, the party opposing the motion has an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits
or other materials allowed by Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. Brinkmeier's unverified and unsworn
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statement that he did not hear the whistle should be disregarded. D & L Supply v. Saurini
775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989).
4.

The Statements Of Gerald and Whitney Hill Are Not
Probative Evidence That Union Pacific Did Not Comply
With The Whistle Statute.

The Hills make no reference to the whistle one way or the other-the subject simply
was not addressed. A failure to make mention that the whistle was sounded does not provide
a basis for arguing that it was not If it did, by the same reasoning Union Pacific could argue
that a failure to mention that the whistle was not sounded gives rise to the implication that
it was. For obvious reasons, including the fact that the statements are not in affidavit or
deposition form, the testimony of Gerald and Whitney Hill is not evidence on the issue of
whether the whistle was blown for the statutory distance or at all. The statements should be
disregarded on this issue.
Union Pacific also notes that in mentioning the Hills' failure to say that the whistle
was sounded, Jensen selectively overlooks the statement from independent eyewitness
Johnny Starks, which was also attached to the Sheriffs Report, that: "I heard the train honking".
5.

There Is No Material Variation In Union Pacific's Evidence
Regarding The Sounding Of The Whistle.

Jensen's argument that Union Pacific has provided conflicting information regarding
the sounding of the locomotive whistle is a red herring. Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14
(Addendum D) does not require a particular "sequence" of whistle sounds-only that tl ^
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whistle QL the bell be operated "continuously"fromone-quarter (1/4) mile away on up to the
crossing. On its face, this continuous whistle requirement could mean one constant blast for
the entire distance without any interruption-or it could mean intermittent blasts of one length
or another "continuously" for the required distance. Statutorily, it does not matter which way
the engineer chooses to do it as long as he does it for the requisite distance. Accordingly,
it is irrelevant whether Union Pacific's Answer to Interrogatory No. 10 dated July 22, 1994,
specified that the whistle was sounded intermittently in a certain sequence of sounds and that
the Statement of Facts in its Motion for Summary Judgment, based upon Engineer Puffer's
later Affidavit, specified that the whistle and bell were being operated "continuously" for the
required distance. Also, Jensen fails to mention that at the same time that Engineer Puffer
provided his Affidavit, Union Pacific filed Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories dated
February 3, 1995, which conformed its earlier Answer to Interrogatory No. 10 to Engineer
Puffer's testimony in his Affidavit. (R. 271-268). Therefore, even if it were relevant, there
is no inconsistency or variation in Union Pacific's facts regarding the sounding of the whistle.
6.

The Speed Indicator Printout Is Not Evidence That The
Whistle Was Not Sounded.

As explained in the attached Supplemental Affidavit of George E. Ohlsson (R. 25958), the speed indicator printout fails to show that the whistle was being sounded because
the design of the 8 track cassette recording device used on the locomotive is of the older type
which does not have a channel for recording the whistle. Accordingly, the reason why the
event recorder printout does not show a whistle is not that the whistle was not being
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sounded. It was because the recorder was not designed or installed on the locomotive to do
so. Jensen adduced no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the event recorder printout is
irrelevant on the issue of whether the whistle was sounded.

IV.
THE CONDITION OF THE CROSSING AT THE TIME OF THE
ACCIDENT DID NOT IMPOSE ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF CARE ON
UNION PACIFIC.
1.

There Is No Probative Evidence That The Crossing Was
More Than Ordinarily Hazardous.

Jensen's only basis for arguing a more than ordinarily hazardous crossing is her
belated affidavit testimony that the auction held at the Utah Livestock Auction premises
located in the southwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is on the opposite side
of the tracks from which Jensen's automobile approached, brought additional traffic
congestion and noise to the area sufficient to obstruct the view of the approaching train and
obscure or muffle the warning sounds of the train's approach. Other than the contradictory
testimony contained in her affidavit, Jensen has not presented even a scintilla of evidence to
the effect that such obstructions were present or that they made the crossing more than
ordinarily hazardous.
While Jensen now testifies by affidavit that "I noticed that there were a lot of trucks
and trailers which obstructed our view of the tracks in all directions/' in earlier answers to
interrogatories Jensen specifically testified that she did not remember whether the view at
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the crossing was obstructed. Union Pacific's Interrogatories Nos. 25 and 26 and Jensen's
Answers thereto state as follows:
25. Describe in detail any and all obstructions to your vision of the
train's approach and railroad crossing where the accident occurred at
the time of the accident.
Answer: I do not recall if the view was obstructed.
26.

State in detail your version of how the accident occurred.

Answer: I remember nothing of the accident and very little, if
anything, of what happened prior to the accident.
As explained in paragraph 111.1 above, for purposes of defeating a motion for summary
judgment Jensen is not allowed to change previously sworn testimony in order to create an
issue of fact. Jensen's affidavit testimony that the train's approach was obstructed should be
disregarded.
Furthermore, there is no probative evidence regarding obstruction to view and no
evidence whatsoever, either in affidavit form or otherwise, that the auction noise obscured
the sound of the warning devices on the train. Accordingly, in the face of the photographs
attached to the Curley Affidavit (R. 113-110), which speak for themselves, Jensen's bare
allegation that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous does not create an issue of
fact for jury consideration as a matter of law. Duncan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 790 P.2d 595
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), affii, 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992).
2.

The Law Imposes No Additional Duty On Union Pacific
Because Of The Nature Of The Crossing.

Jensen misstates the duty of care Utah law imposes on railroads where crossings are
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or may be determined to be more than ordinarily hazardous. Initially, because all railroad
crossings are by their very nature inherently dangerous, a railroad cannot be held liable for
crossing conditions unless the crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous. Id. Where a
crossing is or may be deemed to be extrahazardous, a railroad's duty of care may be
increased thereby but is still limited to those unsafe conditions which it created or over which
it has responsibility. Thus, obstructions caused or created by the railroad or located on
railroad right of way may be the railroad's responsibility to abate. Gleave v. Denver & Rio
Grande Western R.R.. 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Duncan, supra. However,
adjacent property owners have responsibility to remove vegetation or other obstructions on
their property which constitute a "traffic hazard" (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19); and UDOT
has been delegated the responsibihty for regulating the safe travel of motorists on roads and
highways, including those which pass over and across railroad tracks. Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-4-14 et sea.; Duncan, supra.
It is not enough for Jensen to simply allege that the crossing was more than ordinarily
hazardous. She must also allege and prove the specific duty of care that was breached by
Union Pacific, such as the "wild vegetation" the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
allowed to grow on its right of way and which obstructed the motorist's view in Gleave.
supra.
Here Jensen makes the bare allegation of an extrahazardous crossing but fails to allege
how Union Pacific was negligent with respect to such condition. Under Duncan. Union
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Pacific had no duty to signalize the crossing. Under Easterwood Union Pacific had no duty
to reduce its speed (even though it did) below the federal limit. And obviously, Union
Pacific was not responsible for any problems that may have been caused by the livestock
auction which was located entirely off the right of way. As stated in Duncan:
Plaintiff has failed to "demonstrate, or even suggest what more
Union Pacific could [legally] have done to make this crossing
safer, short of installing automatic warning lights and gates,
which admittedly was not its responsibility.
842 P.2d at 833-34. The trial court was correct in ruling as a matter of law that Union
Pacific breached no duty of care owed to the Jensen concerning the alleged unsafe nature of
the crossing.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law the federally set speed limit for the train and trackage where the
crossing is located was 60 m.p.h. and there is no factual dispute that Union Pacific's train
was traveling substantially under that limit. In any event, the train's speed as alleged by
Jensen could not have been a proximate cause of the accident. There is no probative
evidence that the train whistle and bell were not sounded as prescribed by the statute. There
is no probative evidence that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous or even
assuming that it was, that Union Pacific breached any duty of care owed to Jensen with
respect to such alleged condition. Union Pacific submits that the undisputed probative facts
and the applicable law show as a matter of law that the accident was not caused by any
negligence on Union Pacific's part, and that the trial court was correct in granting the
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Railroad's Motion.
DATED this 18th day of January, 1996.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of January, 1996, a copy of the foregoing was
served in the manner indicated below upon the following:
Allen K. Young, Esq.
Young & Kester
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah 84663

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight
Facsimile
No Service
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM A

49 CFR Ch. II (10-1-94 Edition)
Federal Railroad Administration, DOT
§213.9 Classes of track: operating
speed limits.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs
(b) and (c) of this section and
§§ 213.57(b), 213.59(a), 213.113(a), and
213.137 (b) and (c), the following maximum allowable operating speeds apply:
[In miles per hour]

Over track that meets all of the requirements prescribed in tius part
for-

Class
Class
Class
Class
Class
Class

1 track
2 track
3 track
4 track
5 track
6 track

The maximum allowable
operating
speed for
freight
trains is—

10
25
40
60
80

110

The maximum allowable
operating
speed for
passenger
trains is—

15
30
60
80
90
110

(b) If a segment of track does not
meet all of the requirements for its intended class, it is reclassified to the
next lowest class of track for which it
does meet all of the requirements of
this part. However, if the segment of
track does not at least meet the requirements for Class 1 track, operations may continue at Class 1 speeds
for a period of not more than 30 days
without bringing the track into compliance, under the authority of a person designated under § 213.7(a), who has
at least one year of supervisory experience in railroad track maintenance,
after that person determines that operations may safely continue and subject
to any limiting conditions specified by
such person.
(c) Maximum operating speed may
not exceed 110 m.p.h. without prior approval of the Federal Railroad Administrator. Petitions for approval must be
filed in the manner and contain the information required by §211.11 of this
chapter. Each petition must provide
sufficient information concerning the
performance characteristics of the
track, signaling, grade crossing protection, trespasser control where appropriate, and equipment involved and
also concerning maintenance and inspection practices and procedures to be
followed, to establish that the proposed
speed can be sustained in safety.
[36 FR 20336. Oct. 20, 1971, as amended at 38
FR 875, Jan. 5, 1973; 38 FR 23405, Aug. 30, 1973;
47 FR 39402, Sept. 7. 1982; 48 FR 35883, Aug. 8,
1983]

ADDENDUM B

49 CFR Ch. II (10-1-94 Edition)

§ 217.7 Operating rules; filing and recordkeeping.
(a) On or before December 21, 1994,
each Class I railroad, Class II railroad,
the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and each railroad providing
c o m m u t e r service in a metropolitan or
suburban area t h a t is in operation on
November 21, 1994, shall file with the
Federal Railroad Administrator, Washington, DC 20590, one copy of its code of
operating rules, timetables, and timetable special i n s t r u c t i o n s which were
in effect on November 21, 1994. Each
Class I railroad, each Class n railroad,
and each railroad providing commuter
service in a m e t r o p o l i t a n or suburban
area t h a t commences operations after
November 21, 1994, shall file with the
Administrator one copy of its code of
operating rules, timetables, and timetable special instructions before it
commences operations.
(b) After November 21, 1994, each
Class I railroad, each Class II railroad,
the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and each railroad providing
c o m m u t e r service in a metropolitan or
suburban area shall file each new
a m e n d m e n t to its code of operating
rules, each new timetable, and each
new t i m e t a b l e special instruction with
the Federal Railroad Administrator
within 30 days after it is issued.
(c) On or after November 21, 1994,
each Class m railroad and any other
railroad subject to this part but not
subject to paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
section shall keep one copy of its curr e n t code of operating rules, timetables, and timetable special instructions and one copy of each subsequent
a m e n d m e n t to its code of operating
rules, each new timetable, and each
new t i m e t a b l e special instruction, a t
its system headquarters, and shall
m a k e such records available to representatives of the Federal Railroad
Administration for inspection and
copying during normal business hours.
[59 FR 43070, Aug. 22, 1994]
EFFECTIVE DATE NOTE: At 59 FR 43070, Aug.
22, 1994, §217.7 was revised effective November 21, 1994. For the convenience of the user,
the superseded text is set forth below.

J 217-7 Filing of operating rules.
(a) Before February 1, 1975, each railroad
that is in operation on January 1, 1975, shall
file with the Federal Railroad Administrator, Washington, DC 20590, one copy of its
code of operating rules, timetables, and
timetable special instructions which were in
effect on January 1, 1975. Each railroad that
commences operation after January 1, 1975,
shall file with the Administrator one copy of
its code of operating rules, timetables, and
timetable instructions before it commences
operations.
(b) Each amendment to a railroad's code of
operating rules, each new timetable, and
each new timetable special instruction
which is issued after January 1, 1975, shall be
filed with the Federal Railroad Administrator within 30 days after it is issued.

ADDENDUM C

49 CFR.Ch. II (10-1-94 Edition)

§229-117 Speed indicators.
(a) After December 31t 1980, each locomotive used as a controlling locomotive at speeds in excess of 20 miles
per hour shall be equipped with a speed
indicator which is—
(1) Accurate within ±3 miles per hour
of actual speed at speeds of 10 to 30
miles per hour and accurate within ±5
miles per hour at speeds above 30 miles
per hour; and
(2) Clearly readable from the engineer's normal position under all light
conditions.
(b) Each speed indicator required
shall be tested as soon as possible after
departure by means of speed test sections or equivalent procedures.

ADDENDUM D

56-1-14

RAILROADS

56-1-14. P r o c e d u r e s at grade crossings.
Every locomotive shall be provided with a bell which shall be rung continuously from a point not less than eighty rods from any city or town street or
public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or public highway
grade crossing shall be crossed, but, except in towns and at terminal points, the
sounding of the locomotive whistle or siren at least one-fourth of a mile before
reaching any such grade crossing shall be deemed equivalent to ringing the
bell as aforesaid; during the prevalence of fogs, snow and dust storms, the
locomotive whistle shall be sounded before each street crossing while passing
through cities and towns. All locomotives with or without trains before crossing
the main track at grade of any other railroad must come to a full stop at a
distance not exceeding 400 feet from the crossing, and must not proceed until
the way is known to be clear; two blasts of the whistle or two sounds of the
siren shall be sounded at the moment of starting; provided, that whenever
interlocking signal apparatus and derailing switches or any other crossing
protective device approved by the Department of Transportation is adopted
such stop shall not be required.
Provided, that local authorities in their respective jurisdiction may by
ordinance approved by the Department of Transportation provide more restricted sounding of bells or whistles or sirens than is provided herein and may
prescribe points different from those herein set forth at which such signals
shall be given and may further restrict such ringing of bells or sounding of
whistles or sirens so as to provide for either the ringing of a bell or the
sounding of a whistle or of a siren or the elimination of the sounding of such
bells or whistles or sirens or either of them, except in case of emergency.
The term locomotive as used herein shall mean every self-propelled steam
engine, electrically propelled interurban car and so-called diesel operated
locomotive.
Every person in charge of a locomotive violating the provisions of this section
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and the railroad company shall be liable for all
damages which any person may sustain by reason of such violation.

ADDENDUM E

J. CLARE WILLIAMS, #3490
MORRIS O HAGGERTY, #5283
Attorneys for Defendant
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
406 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1151
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALECIA JENSEN,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

vs.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY
Defendant.

)
)

Civil No. 940400280

)

Judge Boyd L. Park

Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing by the Court on April 17, 1995; with defendant being represented by J. Clare Williams
and plaintiff, who was present in the courtroom, being represented by Allen K. Young; and with
the parties having filed written briefs and exhibits and having argued their respective positions to
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now rules as follows:
The Court finds and concludes:
(1)

That the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate cause of the

accident;
(2)

That defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may have

been present at the time of the accident and created a "more than ordinarily hazardous"

crossing; and
(3)

That defendant did sound the train's bell and whistle as it approached the

crossing.
Therefore, the Courtfindsthat there is no genuine issue as to any material fact to prevent
it from acting on defendant's motion as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
orders plaintiffs Complaint dismissed w^th prejudice, with each party to pay its own costs and
expenses.
DATED this _ ^ _ day of June, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

JDG£~BOYDK PARK
Approved as to form this
of
, 1995.

Allen K. Young
Attorney for Plaintiff

day

ADDENDUM F

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

ALECIA JENSEN,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 940400280
DATE May 15, 1995

vs.

JUDGE BOYD L. PARK

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, INC.,
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court on April 17, 1995 for oral argument on
defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. The Court, having received and reviewed the
motion, memorandum in support, memorandum in opposition, reply memorandum, and
supplemental reply memorandum; having heard oral arguments; and having reviewed the
applicable law, now makes the following findings and conclusions:
1.

This Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Although plaintiff is a resident of

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, defendant Union Pacific Railroad is a Utah corporation
authorized to do business in the State of Utah and in Utah County, State of Utah. The
accident which gave rise to this cause of action occurred in Utah County, State of Utah, and
therefore jurisdiction and venue are properly vested in this Court.
2.

On February 5, 1994, the parties were involved in a collision between defendant's

train and plaintiffs automobile. Plaintiff was a passenger in her automobile, which was
crossing the railroad tracks at approximately 5950 South 650 West in Utah County when the
automobile was struck by a train owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff alleges she
suffered severe and permanent injuries as a direct and proximate result of this collision.
3.

On February 7, 1995 defendant filed with this Court a Motion For Summary

Judgment and an accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
For Summary Judgment. On March 2, 1995 plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to
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Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment and a Request for Hearing on Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. On March 15,
1995 Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment was
filed. On April 12, 1995 Defendant's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion For Summary Judgment was filed with the Court. Oral arguments on this motion
were heard on April 17, 1995.
4.

The accident giving rise to this cause of action occurred at approximately 12:10

p.m. on February 5, 1994 at a public railroad crossing of defendant's Provo Subdivision
mainline trackage located near 650 West and 5950 South in Spanish Fork, Utah County. At
the time of the accident, plaintiffs automobile was being driven by plaintiffs boyfriend,
Brace Brinkmeier, also a minor at the time of the accident. Brinkmeier was cited for driving
without a license. The train in question was an empty coal train with three locomotives and
46 trailing empty coal cars. The train weighed 1424 tons and was 2622 feet in length.
5.

According to the train's engineer, the train was traveling from Milford to Provo in

a southwest to northeast direction. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, defendant's Memorandum
in Support, Exhibit D. The trackage at that location is relatively straight and flat. See
Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at % 5(e).
Plaintiffs automobile was traveling southbound on 650 West. The road (650 West) is
straight and flat for hundreds of feet before reaching the crossing. Id. The trackage and
road intersect at an angle greater than 90 degrees with reference to the directions of approach
of the train and car. Id. at % 5(a).
6.

The crossing is located in a rural fanning area and is surrounded by open fields on

the approach side. A Utah Livestock Auction building and animal pens are located in the
southwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is on the opposite side of the tracks
from which plaintiffs automobile approached. The northwest quadrant, which is the view
quadrant for the approaching train and car, is an open field. See Affidavit of Lawrence
Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B. At the time of the accident, a
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livestock auction was taking place. There was a considerable amount of traffic, and trucks
and trailers were parked near the crossing.
7.

An advance stop sign warning sign was posted alongside 650 West approximately

572 feet north of the crossing. Also posted were an advance railroad crossing warning sign,
an advance railroad crossing sign painted on the road, railroad crossing "crossbuck" signs,
and a stop sign. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support,
Exhibit B.
8.

Defendant alleges that its engineer began sounding the locomotive whistle and bell

approximately 1/4 mile away from the 5950 South crossing and continued to sound them up
to the point of the accident at the 650 West crossing. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, ]% 7-8,
defendant's Memorandum m Support, Exhibit D. The distance between the 5950 South and
650 West crossings is approximately 1,100 feet. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley,
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at 1 5(b).
9.

At about the time the train passed over the 5950 South crossing, the engineer

noticed a truck pulling a horse trailer begin to drive over the tracks in a southbound
direction. Shortly after seeing the truck/horse trailer clear the crossing, the engineer noticed
plaintiffs automobile rolling towards the crossing. The car was following a few seconds
behind the truck/horse trailer and moving past the stop sign. The engineer placed the train in
emergency braking immediately upon seeing the car.

See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, ^ff 9-

11, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D.
10.

The train was a few hundred feet from the crossing when the engineer first saw

plaintiff's car approaching the intersection. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, f 10, defendant's
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. It took the train approximately 1,400 feet to stop after
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 5(g). The left side of the snowplow of the leading
locomotive struck the right front portion of the car. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, f 10,
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's
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Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 4(g)-(h). Both occupants were ejected from the car
and thrown in the same northeasterly direction. Neither occupant was wearing a seatbelt.
11.

Defendant alleges that plaintiff and Brinkmeier played a "wish" game upon arrival

at the crossing, lifting their feet from the floor of the car and looking for something metallic
within the car to touch with their fingers while simultaneously making a wish and crossing
the tracks. Plaintiff admits this, but asserts that she has no recollection of doing so just prior
to the collision. The parties agree, for the purpose of the summary judgment motion, that
plaintiff and Brinkmeier never saw or heard the train prior to impact.
12.

The parties agree that the "authorized speed limit" for the trackage in question was

set by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) at 60 m.p.h. for freight trains and 80
m.p.h. for passenger trains. However, defendant Union Pacific voluntarily filed with the
FRA a lower "timetable" speed of only 50 m.p.h. for its freight trains. Plaintiff argues that
it is this timetable speed that applies rather than the FRA's authorized speed limit of 60
m.p.h.
13.

Defendant claims that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least

the last three miles before the engineer initiated emergency braking. See Affidavit of Ryan
Puffer, t 5, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of George E.
Ohlsson, If 7, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. Plaintiff argues that the train
was traveling an average speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the three minutes prior to the collision.
See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews, 1 8, Plaintiffs Memorandum m Opposition, Exhibit 2.
14.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact

exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See U.R.C.P. 56;
Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Furthermore, "[ajlthough summary judgment may on occasion be appropriate in negligence
cases, it is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case." Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d
126, 126 (1987) (citing Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)).
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15.

Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment addresses three areas of analysis: 1)

Union Pacific was not negligent in traveling in excess of the timetable speed limit; 2) Union
Pacific did not fail to reduce the speed of its train through what plaintiff alleged to be a
"more than ordinarily hazardous crossing"; and 3) Union Pacific complied with requirements
of U.C.A. § 56-1-14, which governs the use of whistles and bells when approaching railroad
crossings. The Court will analyze these issues individually.

Authorized Speed Limit
16.

Although the FRA has set the speed limit for freight trains at 60 m.p.h., Union

Pacific has voluntarily chosen to set a lower "timetable" speed limit of 50 m.p.h. for its
freight trains, 10 m.p.h. below the speed limit mandated by the FRA. According to
plaintiffs accident reconstructionist, the train was averaging a speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the
three minutes prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews (Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2). At
oral arguments, plaintiff presented a speed graph obtained from the train's recorder. That
graph indicated variations in the train's speed prior to the accident, and recorded the train's
speed as varying from 50 m.p.h. to as much as 52.5 m.p.h.
17.

Based on data retrieved from the train's Pulse Electronics "speed recorder" device

which electronically recorded the train's speed on tape prior to the accident, defendant claims
that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least the last three miles before
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of George Ohlsson (defendant's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment,
Exhibit F); see also Pulse Electronic printout (defendant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit A). In the Affidavit of
George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific Railroad (see
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F), Mr. Ohlsson stated the following:
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It is difficult for even the most competent engineer to maintain a long and
heavy train at a certain and undeviating speed. The curvature and
undulation of the trackage will retard and increase the speed of a long and
heavy train even though an engineer is holding a steady throttle on the
locomotive. A train which travels for a number of miles at a speed which
does not deviate more than one or two miles an hour is, in my
professional opinion, going at a steady speed. It is simply not possible to
control a train's speed any better than that.
Id. at 1 8.
18.

Defendant argues that the FRA's "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h. for freight

trains preempts plaintiffs claim of excessive speed. Defendant cites CSX Transportation,
Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (1993) in support of its argument that plaintiffs claims
of common law negligence are unfounded. In Easterwood. the plaintiff sued for the death of
her husband resulting from a railroad crossing accident, alleging that CSX was negligent
under Georgia law for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing and for
operating the train at an excessive speed.

The authorized speed limit for the track in

Easterwood was set at 60 m.p.h. and, while conceding that the train was traveling at a speed
under 60 m.p.h., Easterwood nevertheless claimed that CSX breached its common-law duty
to operate its train at a moderate and safe rate of speed.
19.

The federal regulations mvolved in Easterwood had been issued by the Secretary of

Transportation pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), which
established an authorized speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. A clause of the FRSA
permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law, rule, regulation, order, or standard
relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary adopted a regulation covering the
subject matter of such state requirement. The preemption clause of the FRSA (45 U.S.C.S.
§ 434) confers on the Secretary of Transportation the power to preempt state common law.
Given the Secretary's adoption of train-speed regulations pursuant to the FRSA (49 C.F.R. §
213.9(a)), a state's common-law restrictions on train speed are not preserved by a saving
clause in 45 U.S.C.S. § 434, under which a state may continue in force an additional or
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more stringent law relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety hazard and when not incompatible with any federal law. Easterwood,
113 S.Ct. at 1743 (1993).
20.

The Court in Easterwood found for CSX, who had argued that Easterwood's claim

was preempted because the federal speed limits are regulations covering the subject matter of
the common law of train speeds. The Court further stated that to hold otherwise would be to
deprive the Secretary of the power to preempt state common law, a power clearly conferred
by § 434. Therefore, the Court found that Easterwood's reliance on the common law was
incompatible with both the FRSA and the Secretary's regulations. Id. at 1743.
21.

In the case now before this Court, defendant argues that its train was traveling well

below the federally imposed speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. "The fact that the
Union Pacific had set a lower 'timetable' speed limit than that specified by the FRA is
irrelevant since any claim based upon a violation of the railroad set limit would be but a
variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive or unreasonable speed."
See Defendant's Memorandum in Support at 8, f 1.
22.

Plaintiff argues that, because defendant filed its timetable with the FRA pursuant to

49 C.F.R. 217, the Court should consider that action as evidence that the maximum
authorized speed at the intersection of the collision is 50 m.p.h. and that timetables filed with
the FRA are therefore enforceable against the defendant, and train speeds in excess of those
timetables violate federal law. See Affidavit of Bruce Reading (plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition, Exhibit 1).

Furthermore, plaintiff claims that this case is distinguishable from

Easterwood because there is no attempt to impose on Union Pacific a state-enforced speed
regulation which is more stringent than its federal counterpart. Instead, plaintiff claims that
defendant's train was exceeding its own maximum authorized timetable speed, thus violating
federal law, and that defendant was therefore negligent.
23.

Given the ruling in Easterwood and the parties' arguments, the issue now before the

Court is (a) whether Union Pacific's timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. for freight trains is a
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variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive speed and thus preempted
by federal law governing the "subject area," or (b) whether the FRSA covers speed limits
self-imposed by Union Pacific and, if not, whether defendant was negligent in exceeding its
speed limit for freight trains.
24.

The FRSA specifically permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law,

rule, regulation, order, or standard-relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary
adopts a regulation covering the subject matter of such state requirement. This legislation
was designed to prevent states from interfering with regulations established by the FRA. In
this case, it is clear that the FRA had designated an "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h.
for freight trains traveling along this stretch of track. However, the State of Utah has not
attempted to impose a more stringent law, rule, or regulation regarding authorized train
speed. Instead, Union Pacific has created its own timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. The Court
finds the present case to be distinguishable from Easterwood, where the State of Georgia
tried to impose law, rules, or regulations governing train speed. The Court in Easterwood
did not explain how the FRSA addresses the question of timetable speeds which are a) selfimposed by railroad companies and not by States; and b) lower than the federally authorized
train speeds.
25.

In his affidavit, plaintiffs witness Bruce Reading alleges that, under federal law,

each railroad company is required to file a copy of its Operating Rules and Timetables with
the FRA, and concludes that the speed limits mandated in the Union Pacific Railroad
Company Operating Rules and Timetables thus become the federally mandated guidelines and
maximum speed limits for the railroad company and are enforceable by the FRA. See
Affidavit of Bruce Reading, %% 4-9, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 1.
Accordingly, Union Pacific's self-imposed timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. would become its
federally authorized speed and could not be preempted by the FRA.
26.

Defendant argues that 49 C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the

federal speed limits set in 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 and that timetable filings therefore have no
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effect on the maximum speeds at which a railroad may operate its trains. According to
defendant, section 217 requires only the filing of operating rules and timetables, which may
or may not contain speed limits, and does not require that speed limit changes be filed with
the FRA. Defendant again turns to the Easterwood decision and argues that it is § 213.9
which sets the "ceiling" or "maximum" speed, not timetables, and asserts that "[i]mplicit in
such holding is the understanding that while a railroad may not exceed such limit, it may by
internal fiat voluntarily operate its trains at any slower speed deemed appropriate." See
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support at 4.
27.

The Easterwood case does not provide any clear rule as to how one should address

the issue of timetable speeds within 49 C.F.R. §§ 217 and 213.9. However, plaintiff has
equally failed to provide any case law which would substantiate her claim that Union
Pacific's timetable filing under § 217 has an effect on the maximum speed at which a
railroad may operate its train under § 213.9. Defendant has provided the Court with the
recent case of Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Oregon, 9 F.3d 807
(9th Cir. 1993), which supports defendant's argument that the FRA, by requiring Union
Pacific to file its timetable speed limits, does not thereby adopt that timetable limit as a
federal law enforceable against the railroad and preemptive of the speed limits set forth in 49
C.F.R. §213.9. In Southern Pacific, an Oregon law permitted local authorities to ban the
sounding of locomotive whistles under certain conditions. Southern Pacific Transportation
Company argued that the state law was preempted by three federal statutes and moved for
summary judgment. The state of Oregon made a cross-motion for summary judgment,
claiming that its regulations were not preempted as a matter of law. Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Easterwood, the circuit court held that the state law and regulations were
not preempted by any of the three federal statutes cited by Southern Pacific and affirmed the
district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the State of Oregon.
28.

In addressing Southern Pacific's claim that the Oregon statute was also preempted

by 45 C.F.R. § 217, which requires railroads to keep their operating rules on file with the
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FRA, the circuit court stated that "[b]ecause the FRA neither approves nor adopts the
railroad's rules in any manner, the rules do not have the force of law and therefore cannot
preempt die Oregon statute." Southern Pacific, 9.F3d at 812 n.5. This statement is equally
applicable in the case now before this Court, in that it supports defendant's argument that 49
C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the federal speed limits set in 49
C.F.R. § 213.9. The railroad's rules and timetable filings submitted to the FRA in
accordance with section 217 are not approved or adopted by the FRA and therefore do not
have the force of law.
29.

Even if defendant were bound by its timetable speed of 50 m.p.h., there still

remain the questions of (a) whether Union Pacific was negligent in exceeding that speed, and
(b) if the train's speed was a proximate cause of the collision.
30.

The train's speed in this matter was not a causal factor unless the train could have

stopped, prior to collision, from the point at which plaintiff first saw the danger. The Court
agrees with the holding in Dombeck v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 129
N.W.2d 185 (Wise. 1964). In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that, even
under an assumption that the train's speed was negligent, such speed as a matter of law could
not be causal:
In order to be causal the train's speed must either have misled . . . the
driver of the car or it must have interfered with the control and
management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such
control and management would have otherwise been effective to have
avoided the collision.
Id. at 192. As to the first prong of this test, whether Brinkmeier, as driver, or plaintiff, as
passenger, were misled as to the speed of the train, plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she
did not see the train prior to the collision, nor did she hear the train blow its whistle or
sound its horn prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, ^ 7-8, Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3. In his recorded statement, Mr. Brinkmeier also
stated that he did not hear the train or its horn. See the recorded statement of Bruce
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Brinkmeier at 15, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. The Court finds that,
because both plaintiff and Brinkmeier admit that they were not looking or listening for a
train, and because both stated that they never saw or heard the train prior to impact, neither
could have been misled as to the speed of the train in estimating its time of arrival at the
crossing. As to the second prong of this test, whether the train's speed interfered with the
control and management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such control
and management would have otherwise been effective to have avoided the collision, the
Court finds that plaintiff has made no argument or produced any evidence that the train could
have been stopped or sufficiently slowed to have allowed plaintiffs automobile to safely
cross the tracks if the train had indeed been traveling 50 m.p.h. at the time the engineer
activated the emergency brakes. Defendant, however, provided the Court with the Affidavit
of Ryan Puffer, the engineer. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. In his
affidavit, Engineer Puffer stated that he placed the train into emergency braking as soon as
he saw plaintiffs automobile, because it was his impression that the car was not going to
stop and was going to come onto the track directly in front of the train. He further stated
that "[a] long heavy train takes a number of seconds, after placing it into emergency braking,
before it even begins to slow down. On this occasion the train did not even begin to slow
down before the accident happened." Id. at ^ 11. In addition, defendant provided the Court
with the affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific
Railroad Company. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. In his affidavit,
Mr. Ohlsson stated that the small difference between the 50 m.p.h. timetable speed and an
actual speed of approximately 51 m.p.h. "would not have made any significant difference in
terms of how far the train would have gone before slowing down or stopping after the brakes
were applied. A matter of 1 m.p.h. is, in my opinion, insignificant in terms of stopping time
and distance." Id. at ^10.
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31.

For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the train had been traveling one or

two miles above the timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h., the train's speed was not a
proximate cause of the accident.
Dangerous Crossing
32.

According to the Utah Supreme court in English v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 P.47

(1896), a crossing that is "more than ordinarily hazardous" places an additional duty of care
on the railroad. Plaintiff argues that several conditions existed at the time of the accident
which created a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. These conditions include (a) an
auction barn near the tracks accompanied by the busy nature of a livestock auction; and (b)
trucks and trailers parked near the crossing which may have impeded vision or caused
plaintiff to not hear the train as it approached. According to plaintiff, the accident occurred
during a time when the commotion and noise of a livestock auction rendered the nearby
crossing "more than ordinarily hazardous."
33.

More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals applied the English standard of "more

than ordinarily hazardous" in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 749 P.2d
660 (Utah App. 1988). In Gleave, the plaintiff was hit by an empty coal train at a crossing
in Springville. Utah. The court instructed the jury that "UDOT was statutorily given
ultimate responsibility for crossing design and warning and safety devices and that,
accordingly, [the jury] could not find Rio Grande negligent 'based upon any defects which
might exist with respect to the design of the 1600 South crossing or based upon any problems
you may perceive in the lack of traffic warning devices' there." Id. at 663. The jury found
the crossing to be more than ordinarily hazardous and then further found that Rio Grande
failed to exercise reasonable care in driving the train across the roadway "given the
crossing's design, its physical characteristics, and the existing warning signs." Id. at 664.
The conditions that contributed to this "hazardous" crossing in Gleave included a dangerous
crossing angle, a mound of earth, and a curving track.
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34.

In Duncan v. Union Pacific R.R., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), a car containing a

driver and three passengers was struck by a freight train in Tooele County on Droubay Road.
While the road intersected the track at 43 degrees on the north and 136 degrees on the south,
nothing obstructed the motorist's view of the tracks for several thousand feet. The Utah
Supreme court in Duncan affirmed the trial court's finding that the "crossing was not 'more
than ordinarily hazardous' because plaintiffs could not demonstrate, or even suggest, what
more Union Pacific could have done to make this crossing safer, short of installing automatic
warning lights and signs and gates, which admittedly was not its responsibility." Id, at 833.
However, the Duncan court did reiterate the criteria used in the English case to determine
whether a crossing would be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous:
[A] crossing might be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous if it was
in a thickly populated portion of a city; if the view of the tracks was
obstructed because of the railroad itself or natural objects; if the crossing
was frequented by heavy traffic so that approaching trains could not be
heard; or if, for any reason, devices employed at the crossing were
rendered inadequate to warn the public of the danger of an approaching
train.
Id. at 834 (quoting English, 13 Utah at 419-20, 45 P. at 50 (1896)).
35.

In light of the criteria set forth in English and reiterated in Duncan, the plaintiff in

this case now argues that conditions present at the time of the accident, namely the auction
barn and the traffic and commotion which accompany a livestock auction, meet the criteria of
a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. Plaintiff further argues that a factfinder should
therefore be allowed to determine if the crossing was hazardous and, if so, whether
defendant exercised reasonable care when driving the train across this particular railroad
crossing.
36.

While not agreeing that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous, defendant

argues that, assuming arguendo, "such a scenario does not impose a duty upon Union Pacific
to reduce the train's speed below the federally mandated limit." See defendant's
Memorandum in Support at 9, ^ 1. Defendant argues that the plaintiff in Easterwood also
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alleged unsafe crossing conditions requiring additional warning devices. However, despite
the Easterwood court's finding that plaintiff may have had a viable claim for an unsafe
crossing, the Court found that the railroad had no duty to reduce the train's speed below the
federal limit. Defendant argues that its train was traveling 10 m.p.h. below the federal limit
and that because the FRA sets train speeds with crossing safety concerns already in mind,
plaintiffs allegation of defendant's failure to reduce the speed of its train through the "more
than ordinarily hazardous" crossing is unfounded.
37.

Defendant further argues that, when a crossing is deemed to be extrahazardous, a

railroad's duty of care is limited to those unsafe conditions which it created or over which it
has responsibility. See defendant's Reply Memorandum at 13. Defendant cites Gleave v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Duncan v.
Union Pacific R. Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1990), in alleging that a railroad's duty of care
extends only to obstructions to view or sound caused by the railroad or located on railroad
right of way or property. Defendant then cites Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19, which places a
duty of care on property owners to remove vegetation or other obstructions on their property
which constitute a traffic hazard by obstructing the view of any motor vehicle operator, and
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14 et seq., which delegates to the Utah Department of Transportation
(UDOT) the responsibility for regulating the safe travel of motorists on roads and highways,
including those which pass over and across railroad tracks.
38.

This Court finds that, even if a jury could determine the existence of conditions that

would make the accident site a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing, those conditions
were not the responsibility of defendant. The noise around the auction was not something
within defendant's control. The fact that there were "No Parking" signs posted around the
area following the accident to prevent parked cars from obstructing drivers' views of the
railroad track does not imply any lack of care on defendant's part prior to the accident, since
such precautions are not the defendant's responsibility.
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39.

For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the railroad crossing was a "more

than ordinarily hazardous" crossing when a livestock auction was in progress, any unusually
hazardous conditions resulting from the auction were not defendant's responsibility.
U.C.A § 56-1-14 (Locomotive Bells & Whistles)
40.

Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 governs the operation of locomotive whistle and bell

devices at public railroad crossings. It provides as follows:
Every locomotive shall be provided with a bell which shall be rung
continuously from a point not less than than 80 rods from any city or town
street or public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or
public highway grade shall be crossed, but, except in towns and at
terminal points, the sounding of the locomotive whistle or siren at least
1/4 of a mile before reaching any such grade crossing shall be deemed
equivalent to ringing the bell as aforesaid. . .
Id, According to defendant, where the grade crossing is in a rural area such as the one in
question, the requirement is that either the bell or the whistle must be operated beginning "at
least" 1320 feet from the crossing. Defendant argues that Engineer Puffer sounded both the
bell and the whistle approximately 1/4 of a mile from the crossing, well in excess of the
statutorily required distance of 1320 feet.
41.

Plaintiff argues that neither the driver nor the passenger of the car ever heard the

train's whistle or bells prior to the accident. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3, and the recorded statement of Bruce Brinkmeier,
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. Plaintiff alleges that the Pulse Electronics
graph, attached to the Affidavit of Bruce Reading, indicates that no whistles or bells were
sounded by the train as it approached the crossing. Plaintiff points to the statements of
several witnesses who were near the crossing at the time of the accident. In their voluntary
statements to police, Gerald and Whitney Hill made no mention of the train's whistle or bells
at the time of the accident. Other witnesses also made voluntary statements to police and
said nothing about hearing the train's whistle or bells at the time of the accident. However,
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plaintiff has not provided the Court with any such statements in affidavit form, as required
by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
42.

The failure of the Pulse Electronics graph to record the whistle or bells of the train

prior to the accident is explained by George E. Ohlsson in his Supplemental Affidavit. Mr.
Ohlsson stated that the event recorder device installed on the locomotive used only 8-track
cassettes, which do not have sufficient channels to record everything relative to the operation
of the train; specifically, the 8-track cassette does not have a channel for showing whether
the horn or whistle was being sounded. See Supplemental Affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, f
2. Mr. Ohlsson further stated that Union Pacific is beginning to replace the 8-track cassette
event recorders with solid state event recorders which are capable of recording the sounding
of a train's whistle. Id. at K 4. Furthermore, there is testimony in the police record to
support defendant's claim that the train did sound its whistle and bells at some point before
reaching the crossing, and that there were witnesses to the accident who did hear the train's
whistle and bells. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit A (Voluntary
Statements of Johnny Starks and Robert Craw). Ryan Puffer, engineer of the train, stated
that he began sounding the whistle and the bells approximately 1/4 mile away from the
crossing at 5950 South, and then continued operating the bells and whistle from 5950 South
for another 1100 feet until the train reached the crossing at 650 West where the accident
occurred. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit C.
43.

The Court finds that, despite plaintiffs reference to the voluntary statements of

witnesses who said nothing about having heard the train's bells or whistle, plaintiff did not
submit any affidavits to that effect in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that
those witnesses were in a position to hear the bells and whistles if they had in fact been
sounded. Conversely, defendant submitted the affidavit of the train's engineer, Ryan Puffer,
who stated that he checked the train prior to leaving Milford to verify that the brakes,
whistle, and headlights worked properly. Mr. Puffer also stated that he sounded the train's
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bells and whistles for over 1/4 of a mile prior to reaching the crossing at 5950 South, and
continued to sound the whistle beyond that crossing because he knew there was another
crossing (the 650 West crossing) shortly beyond the 5950 South crossing. Finally, Mr.
Puffer stated that he was sounding the whistle continuously as he watched the track and horse
trailer cross the tracks just ahead of plaintiffs automobile.
44.

The Court finds the affidavit evidence presented is uncontradicted and that

defendant did appropriately sound the train's bells and whistle as warning.
Conclusion
45.

The Court concludes (a) that the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate

cause of the accident; (b) that defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may
have been present at the time of the accident and creating a "more than ordinarily hazardous"
crossing; and (c) that defendant did sound the train's bells and whistle as it approached the
crossing. Therefore, the Court finds no genuine issues of material fact remain as to
defendant's liability to plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court grants defendant's Motion For
Summary Judgment.
Counsel for defendant is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an order
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to
form prior to submission to the Court for signature.
Dated at Provo, Utah this 15th day of May, 1995.

JUD3E BOYD L. PARK
cc:

J. Clare Williams
Allen Young
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